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INTRODUCTION:
Recently, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided the
issue of whether the filing of a state antitrust class action tolls the
statute of limitations for individual members of that class, who after
dismissal of their state class action, attempt to file individual federal
antitrust claims.1 State supreme courts have wrestled with the related
question of whether the filing of a federal class action tolls the statute
of limitations for class members who seek to file subsequent state law
claims after their federal class action is dismissed, reaching opposing
outcomes.2 However, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re Copper
∗

J.D. candidate, May 2006, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; University of Illinois B.A. December 2002.
1
See In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2006).
2
See In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 223 F.R.D. 335 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (finding
that Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, South Carolina, and Tennessee would all accept
cross jurisdictional tolling); Vaccareillo v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 94 Ohio
St. 3d 380 (Ohio 2001) (Ohio Supreme Court adopted cross jurisdictional tolling in
an antitrust case); Maestas v. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 33 S.W.3d 805, 807
(Tenn. 2000) (stating Tennessee has adopted cross jurisdictional tolling through its
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Antitrust Litigation3 marked the first time a federal Court of Appeals
addressed whether members of a state class action whose case had
been dismissed could benefit from the cross jurisdictional tolling of
the statute of limitations for their subsequent federal claims.
The factual underpinnings of In re Copper Antitrust Litigation,4
where the very same antitrust claims that were dismissed in the state
class action were subsequently filed individually by class members in
the federal action,5 forced the Seventh Circuit to address the issue of
cross jurisdictional tolling head on. In a 2-1 decision, the court held
that the filing of a state class action has no tolling effect on the statute
of limitations for subsequently filed federal claims, thereby refusing to
adopt the theory of cross jurisdictional tolling.6
Initially, this Article discusses the conflicts in class action
procedure between the statute of limitations and class certification that
necessitated a tolling rule for class members so that their interests
could truly be protected in the class action procedure, and then
examines the subsequent expansion of the tolling doctrine. Next, this
Article recounts the procedural history of the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in In re Copper Antitrust Litigation,7 where the Plaintiff’s
asserted state class action antitrust claims and then later filed
individual federal antitrust claims presented the possibility that the
tolling doctrine could be extended to apply across jurisdictions. The
final section of this Article analyzes the rationales asserted by the
majority In re Copper Antitrust Litigation8 which refused to extend the
tolling doctrine to the cross jurisdictional context and Judge Wood’s

savings statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-1-115 (2000)); Portwood v. Ford Motor Co.,
183 Ill.2d 459 (Ill. 1998) (Illinois Supreme Court declined to adopt cross
jurisdictional tolling).
3
In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 784-85.
4
Id.
5

Id. at 788.
Id. at 796.
7
436 F.3d 782.
8
Id.
6
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dissent which contended that the parallel state and federal antitrust
statutory schemes provided the proper context to apply the tolling
doctrine in the cross jurisdictional context.
In order to fully understand the rationale behind the court’s
decision, the relationship between state and federal antitrust law, as
well as the procedural workings of class actions, must be examined.
I.

HISTORY OF CLASS ACTION TOLLING

Antitrust laws have provided fertile ground for the maintenance of
class action suits.9 Specifically, two criteria of the Clayton Act,10 the
federal statutory scheme regulating anticompetitive business practices,
enable antitrust claims to grow into complex class action lawsuits: (1)
a broad standing requirement,11 and (2) a grant of diversity jurisdiction
irrespective of the amount in controversy.12 These two characteristics
of the Clayton Act13 create a large pool of prospective plaintiffs with
many small claims against a single defendant.14 Similarly, the purpose
of the Sherman Act,15 which protects against limitations on the free
flow of interstate commerce, has been interpreted broadly to allow

9

See Stephen Calkins, An Enforcement Official’s Reflections on Antitrust Class
Actions, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 414 (1997) (“[T]he roots of antitrust class action
practice can be traced to the very beginning of the antitrust laws.”).
10
15 U.S.C. § 15, et seq. (2006).
11
Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982) (“[Section 4 of the
Clayton Act] does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to
competitors, or to sellers. . . . The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage,
protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they
may be perpetrated.”).
12
See HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §
18:1 (4th ed. 2002) (“Congress has given private citizens rights of action for
injunctive relief and damages for antitrust violations without regard to the amount in
controversy.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (2002); 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (2002)).
13
15 U.S.C. § 15, et seq. (2006).
14
See Newberg, supra note 10, at § 18:1.
15
15 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. (2006).
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private individuals to pursue diverse antitrust claims.16 However,
instead of requiring these prospective plaintiffs to file suits
individually, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 allows a single
plaintiff to represent all individuals who suffered an antitrust injury
through a class action in order to avoid a multiplicity of actions within
federal court.17
While a class action may improve efficiency by combining
numerous claims into one action, it also presents procedural
complications for individual class members, such as with the statute of
limitations.18 Initially, after the passage of Rule 23, federal courts
dealt with a statute of limitations problem that arose out of the timing
of class certification decisions.19
Until a class of plaintiffs is certified, the proposed members of the
class are typically unaware of the pending suit because they have not
yet received notice of the suit.20 Because class certification decisions
are often in-depth and lengthy proceedings, the statute of limitations
applicable to the prospective plaintiffs’ claims often expire before the
court decides whether to certify the class.21 Therefore, if the court did

16

Paramount Pictures Inc. v. United Motion Picture Theater Owners, Inc., 93
F.2d 714, 719 (3d Cir. 1937) (“Congress intended by the anti-trust acts to prevent all
combinations and conspiracies, whether composed of employees, employers,
producers, users, or consumers, from unreasonably restraining the free flow of
interstate commerce”).
17
See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 551 (1974) (purpose of
Rule 23 is to prevent a multiplicity of actions).
18
See RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE, 460 (4th ed. 2004) (class
actions create timing problems with the statute of limitations).
19
Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. at 550 (considering whether statute of
limitations for putative class members should be tolled while the court decides class
certification); See also Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968); Philadelphia
Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (ED Pa. 1968).
20
See Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (no class action
may be “dismissed or compromised without [court] approval,” preceded by notice to
class members) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(e)).
21
Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. at 551 (recognizing that putative class
members may not assert claims before the statute of limitations because they are
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not toll the statute of limitations for prospective class members, either
unaware of their claims or waiting for their claims to be resolved in
the commenced class action, foreclosed class members from taking
any individual action in the suit.22 This “black-hole” created by the
intersection of the timing of a class certification decision and the
expiration of the statue of limitations creates problems when the court
ultimately refuse sto certify a class.23
If the class was eventually certified, prospective class members
escaped this black-hole because Rule 23 provides that their claims are
asserted on their behalf by the class representative, and thus there was
no need for prospective class members to take individual action in the
suit.24 However, if the court ultimately refuses to certify the class,
without the benefit of tolling , prospective class members needed to
take individual action if they sought to intervene in the suit.25

unaware that the suit existed or anticipated that their interests would be protected if
they knew of the commencement of the suit); see also Escott v. Barchris
Construction Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 735 (2d Cir. 1965) (Friendly, J., concurring)
(interplay between statute of limitations and class certification presents a “trap” for
putative class members that are unaware of the pending suit until after the statute of
limitations has expired and then later seek to protect their interests).
22
Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. at 551.
23
Id. at 551-52 (although the Court's rationale supports tolling only for claims
of putative class members who actually rely on the pendency of a class action, the
tolling doctrine adopted by the court also applies to claims of class members who do
not rely on, or who were unaware of, a pending class action).
24
At least with regard to preserving their claims. Id. at 550 ( “filing of a timely
class action complaint commences the action for all members of the class as
subsequently determined”).
25
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for two types of intervention.
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2) grants an intervention as of right: “(1) when a statute of
the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the
applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the
subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the
applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.” Fed R. Civ. Proc.
24(b)(2) allows for permissive intervention: “(1) when a statute of the United States
confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense
and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.”

24
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The Supreme Court in American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah,26
addressed this problem involving the relationship between the statute
of limitations and class certification by establishing a class action
tolling rule, whereby the statute of limitations for intervenors is tolled
until the court makes a class certification decision.27 By tolling the
statute of limitations during the class certification process prospective
class members no longer lose their right to individual action in the suit
before they were even aware of the suit,28 thereby removing the blackhole from the Rule 23 landscape.
In American Pipe,29 the State of Utah filed a class action in the
United States District Court for the District of Utah eleven days before
the four year statute of limitations ran under the Sherman Act.30 After
seven months, the district court dismissed Utah’s petition for class
certification, which sought to represent public agencies in Utah and
surrounding states that used concrete and steel.31 Eight days after the
district court dismissed the class action, more than sixty towns,
municipalities and water districts in the State of Utah, each of whom
had been members of the dismissed class, filed a motion to intervene
in the suit.32 The district court denied the motions to intervene,
concluding that the intervenors had no interest in the suit because the
statute of limitations, which applied to their Sherman Act33 claims, had
expired.34 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district courts
decision, denying the motions to intervene and concluding that the
intervenors claims had not expired under the statute of limitations
because they were effectively filed when the State of Utah originally
filed a class action on behalf of them as members of a class.35
26

Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. at 538.
Id. at 559.
28
Id. at 551.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 541.
31
Id. at 542.
32
Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. 538 at 543-544.
33
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
34
Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. 538 at 544.
35
Id.
27
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The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision,36 but
did not limit its decision to the precise time when prospective class
members’ claims were filed. Instead, the Supreme Court extended the
logic of the Ninth Circuit, noting:
[P]otential class members retain the option to participate in or
withdraw from the class action only until a point in the
litigation “as soon as practical after the commencement” of the
action when the suit is allowed to continue as a class action
and they are sent notice of their inclusion within the confines
of the class.”37
Defining class certification as the point in which class members
must decide whether to opt out of a class action, the Supreme Court
dismissed the notion that taking individual action in the suit after the
statutory limitations has run amounts to a “separate cause of action.”38
The Supreme Court concluded that in light of the amendments to Rule
23, “a federal class action is no longer an invitation to joinder but a
truly representative suit designed to avoid, rather than encourage,
unnecessary filing of repetitious papers and motions.”39 The Supreme
Court went on to reason that if it only allowed potential class members
to participate in a class action if they filed motions to intervene before
the statute of limitations had run, the efficiency principles behind Rule
23, which was designed to allow one plaintiff to file a claim on behalf
of numerous similarly situated plaintiffs to avoid repetitious filings,

36

Id. at 559.
Id. at 549 (citing subdivision (c)(1) of Rule 23, which provides “As soon as
practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court
shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this
subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision
on the merits.”).
38
Id. at 550. (specifically overruling the decision in Athas v. Day, 161 F.Supp.
916 (Colo. 1958) (holding that claims filed by class members after the expiration of
the statute of limitations constituted a “separate cause of action.”)).
39
Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. at 550.
37

26
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would be defeated.40 Therefore, to best protect the efficiencies of Rule
23, the Supreme Court adopted a tolling rule which dictates that the
commencement of a class action suit suspends the applicable statute of
limitations for all proposed members of the class,41 including absent
class members.42 By adopting a class action tolling rule, the Supreme
Court gave considerable power to absent class members to extend the
time period in which to file claims.43
The tolling doctrine established in American Pipe44 plays an
important role in assuring that members of a class can actually
participate in the class action litigation, especially when they believe
the class representative has not adequately represented their interests.45
However, the tolling doctrine grew to encompass a far greater power
for class members, the ability to have the statute of limitations tolled
for any subsequent individual claims when a class action status is not
granted.46 After appellate courts began to limit the American Pipe
tolling doctrine strictly to putative class members who filed motions to

40

Id. at 553-554.
Id. at 554.
42
Id. at 551-52 (“We think no different standard should apply to those members
of the class who did not rely upon the commencement of the class action (or who
were even unaware that such a suit existed) and thus cannot claim that they are
refrained from bringing timely motions for individual intervention or joinder because
of a belief that their interests would be represented in the class suit”).
43
See e.g., Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Norman Menachem Feder, The
Impropriety of Class Action Tolling for Mass Tort Statutes of Limitations, 64 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 532, 540 (1996) (“American Pipe thus invested civil litigants with
unusual power. Merely by filing a pleading labeled a ‘class action,’ the Court
enabled individual litigants to alter the otherwise applicable limitations period
affecting asserted claims.”).
44
Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. 538.
45
Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. at 544, n.8 (providing the requirements for
intervention as of right which allows for intervention when the class member’s
interests are not adequately represented).
46
See Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354-55 (1983)
(“Once the statute of limitations has been tolled, it remains tolled for all members of
the putative class until class certification is denied. At that point, class members may
choose to file their own suits or to intervene as plaintiffs in the pending action.”).
41

27
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intervene after class action status was denied,47 the Supreme Court
expanded the scope of the tolling doctrine.
In order to justify expanding the tolling doctrine to subsequent
individual claims asserted by class action members, the Supreme
Court in Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker,48 reiterated its
previous holding in American Pipe49 that a tolling rule for class
actions is not inconsistent with the purposes served by statutes of
limitations.50 Noting that the primary purposes of limitations periods
were met when a class action is commenced,51 the Court determined
that class members that do not file independent suits while the class
action is still proceeding are not “sleeping on their rights,” specifically
because Rule 23 encourages class members to allow the named
plaintiffs to pursue their claims.52 Combined with the view that class
complaints adequately put defendants on notice of the claims sought
against them and that they should preserve appropriate evidence, the
Court stated that tolling the statute of limitations presents no element
of unfair surprise to defendants who are later faced with either a
motion to intervene or a latter individual suit by an absent class
member.53 The Supreme Court concluded that if the tolling rule did
not also apply to individuals filing an individual suit, such an
application would prejudice class members who do not wish to
intervene, but rather opt out of the class action all together.54

47

Id. at 348-49 (citing Pavlak v. Church, 681 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1982); Stull v.
Bayard, 561 F.2d 429, 433 (2d Cir. 1977); Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 783 (2d
Cir. 1977).
48
Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 462 U.S. 345.
49
Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. 538.
50
See Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 462 U.S. at 352 (“Limitations periods are
intended to put defendants on notice of adverse claims and to prevent plaintiffs from
sleeping on their rights, but these ends are met when a class action is
commenced.”)(citations omitted).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 350-51. Class members may prefer to opt out of the class action
entirely and file an individual suit as opposed to intervening based on the

28
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While the majority in Crown55 readily extended the tolling
doctrine to class members subsequent individual claims, the
concurrence offered by Justice Powell cautioned that the “tolling rule
of American Pipe is a generous one, inviting abuse.”56 In light of the
new expansive tolling rule Justice Powell warned district courts that
they should only apply the tolling doctrine to a class members
individual lawsuit if that “suit raises claims that concern the same
evidence, memories, and witnesses as the subject matter of the original
class suit so that the defendant will not be prejudiced.”57
Although the tolling doctrine is established law within the federal
courts, there remains a parallel question of whether the Supreme
Court’s rational in American Pipe58 and Crown59 can be applied to toll
the statute of limitations in a completely different jurisdiction. Much
litigation and scholarship has addressed whether the filing of a federal
class action tolls the statute of limitations for individual class members
in state court claims.60 The intricacies and individual preferences of
state courts have created a split in state courts over whether they will
accommodate cross jurisdictional tolling.61 Despite the relative
frequency with which state courts have addressed cross jurisdictional
tolling, the Seventh Circuit recently became the first federal Appellate

inconvenience of the forum the class action is situated in, a desire to maintain
complete control over the litigation, or as a result of the court’s refusal to grant
intervention. Id. at 351-352.
55
Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 462 U.S. 345.
56
Id.at 354.
57
Id. at 355 (internal quotations omitted).
58
Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
59
Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 462 U.S. 345.
60
See In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 223 F.R.D. 335 (finding that Colorado,
Indiana, Kansas, South Carolina, and Tennessee would all accept cross jurisdictional
tolling); Vaccareillo v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 94 Ohio St. 3d 380 (Ohio
2001) (Ohio Supreme Court adopted cross jurisdictional tolling in an antitrust case);
Maestas v. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 33 S.W.3d 805, 807 (Tenn. 2000) (stating
Tennessee has adopted cross jurisdictional tolling through its savings statute, TENN.
CODE ANN. § 28-1-115 (2000)); Portwood v. Ford Motor Co., 183 Ill.2d 459 (Ill.
1998) (Illinois Supreme Court declined to adopt cross jurisdictional tolling).
61
See supra note 58.

29
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Court to decide whether the principals of American Pipe62 and
Crown63 allow a member of a state class action to receive the benefit
of tolling for their subsequently filed individual federal claims.64
The warnings of Justice Powell’s concurrence in Crown65
seemingly predicted the debate over whether cross jurisdictional
tolling should extend to federal courts.66 The majority’s opinion in In
re Copper Antitrust Litigation67 relied on Justice Powell’s trepidation
that the court’s precedent of extending tolling from intervenors to class
members who assert subsequent independent claims was inviting
abuse of Supreme Court precedent, and denied cross jurisdictional
tolling as an abuse of the American Pipe68 tolling doctrine that over
extends its logic.69 The dissent, however, asserted Justice Powell’s
“same evidence, memories, and witnesses” test70 as a rationale to
allow cross jurisdictional tolling, contending that the state class action
anti-trust claims alleged by the plaintiffs were exactly the same as the
claims subsequently they later alleged individually in federal court.71
The interplay between state and federal antitrust laws provided a
particularly good landscape for the Seventh Circuit to address cross
jurisdictional tolling. Many state courts have adopted the federal
antitrust scheme in their state antitrust laws, thereby creating nearly
identical state and federal remedies for antitrust claims.72 Because the

62

Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. 538.
Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 462 U.S. 345.
64
In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d 782.
65
Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 462 U.S. 345.
66
Id. at 354-55 (“the tolling rule of American Pipe is a generous one, inviting
abuse [and should be limited to situations involving] the same evidence, memories,
and witnesses as the subject matter of the original class suit so that the defendant
will not be prejudiced.”).
67
In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d 782.
68
Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. 538.
69
In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 796 (citing Judge Meskill’s dissent
in Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698 (2d. Cir. 1987)).
70
Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 462 U.S. at 355.
71
In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 799.
72
See, e.g,. Odom v. Lee, 999 P.2d 755, 761 (Alaska 2000); (Claims brought
under Alaska Stat. § 45.50.562 are analogous to claims brought under § 1 of the
63
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state and federal antitrust schemes are so similar, the plaintiffs in In re

Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1, and federal cases construing § 1 of the Sherman Act
will be used as a guide); Brooks Fiber Communications v. GST Tucson Lightwave,
992 F. Supp. 1124 (Ariz. 1997) (ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 44-1401-16 mirrors federal
antitrust law; where summary judgment is inappropriate on federal claims under the
Sherman Act, it is also inappropriate on state law claims under this article.);
Oakland-Alameda County Builders’ Exch v. F.P. Lathrop Constr. Co., 4 Cal. 3d 354
(Cal. 1971)( California’s antitrust statute the Cartwright Act is patterned after the
federal Sherman Act, and “federal cases interpreting the Sherman Act are applicable
in construing the Cartwright Act”); Kukui Nuts of Haw., Inc. v. R. Baird & Co., 789
P.2d 501, (Haw. Ct. App. 1990), (HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 480-1 provides restraints on
anticompetitive business activity, must be construed in accordance with judicial
interpretations of similar federal antitrust statutes); Onat v. Penobscot Bay Medical
Center, 574 A.2d 872, 876 (Me. 1990) (evidence that defendant violated Sherman
Act would support a violation of ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101, Maine’s
antitrust provision); General Aviation, Inc. v Garrett Corp., 743 F. Supp 515 (W.D.
Mich. 1990)(Federal precedents interpreting Sherman act are authoritative in
considering virtually identical provisions in Michigan antitrust reform act); Metts v.
Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 618 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)(“[Missouri’s
Antitrust Statutes are] analogous to and derived from § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1. Section 416.141 of Missouri's Antitrust Statutes requires that §§ 416.011
to 416.161 be construed in harmony with ruling judicial interpretations of
comparable federal antitrust statutes”); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 598A.050 (1997)
(construction of the Nevada antitrust statute “shall be construed in harmony with
prevailing judicial interpretations of the federal antitrust statutes”); Smith Mach. Co.
v. Hesston Corp., 878 F.2d 1290,1292-93 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1073, 110 (1990) (“[New Mexico’s antitrust statute] is patterned after § 1 of the
federal Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1 et seq., and mandates a construction in
harmony with judicial interpretations of the federal antitrust laws.”); AnheuserBusch, Inc. v Abrams, 71 NY. 2d 327, (N.Y. 1988) (“the Donnelly Act …, often
called a ‘Little Sherman Act,’ should generally be construed in light of Federal
precedent and given a different interpretation only where State policy, differences in
the statutory language or the legislative history justify such a result.”); Gonzalez v.
San Jacinto Methodist Hosp., 880 S.W.2d 436, 441 (Tx. App. 1994) (citing TEX.
BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.04 (Vernon 1987) and stating that “the [Texas] state
Antitrust Act should be construed in harmony with federal judicial interpretations of
comparable federal antitrust statutes,”); Net Realty Holding Trust v. Franconia
Properties, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 759, 767, n.10 (E.D. Va. 1982) (“The wording of the
Virginia restraint-of-trade provision is virtually identical to that of its federal
counterpart”).
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Copper Antitrust Litigation73 attempted to adopt the rationale in
Crown74 that tolling is proper where former class members assert
claims individually that are identical to their previous class action
claims, and argue that their federal antitrust claims should be tolled
during the pendency of their state antitrust class action.75
II.

THE IN RE COPPER ANTITRUST LITIGATION DECISION:

A.

Cases Leading to In re Copper Antitrust Litigation

The Seventh Circuit’s decision In re Copper Antitrust Litigation76
resulted from an intriguing intersection between antitrust law and class
action procedures.77 As mentioned supra, antitrust law is not only
useful for providing the basis for class action claims, but also the
interplay between state and federal class action laws provides the
unique opportunity for plaintiffs to seek nearly identical claims in
either state or federal court.78 As a result, a complex series of
interrelated cases can develop, as seen in In re Copper Antitrust
Litigation.79 Two series of cases underlying In re Copper Antitrust
Litigation80 need to be dissected in order to understand the Seventh
Circuit’s decision that state class action members cannot benefit from
tolling when they file subsequent individual federal claims. The first
case is the underlying federal suit, where the plaintiffs in In re Copper

73

In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d 782.
Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 462 U.S. 345.
75
In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 798.
76
In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d 782.
77
In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 784 (Justice Wood noting that
“[a]lthough this appeal arises out the extensive alleged conspiracy to fix price in
various copper markets….the issues that concern us here would find a more
comfortable home in a civil procedure class than an anti-trust class.”); Crown, Cork
& Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983).
78
See supra notes 7, 8, and 40.
79
In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d 782.
80
Id.
74
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Antitrust Litigation81 filed individual federal antitrust claims based on
allegations of price fixing in copper markets.82 The statute of
limitations for the plaintiff’s federal antitrust claims had expired, but
the plaintiffs contended that the previous filing of a state antitrust class
action tolled the statute of limitations for the federal suit.83
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit also examined the plaintiff’s claims
in the previously filed state class action to determine the availability of
tolling in the underlying federal suit.84
1.

The Federal Suit: Loeb Indus., Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp.

The underlying federal suit, Loeb Indus., Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp.,
dealt with price fixing in copper markets.85 In Loeb, Southwire
Company, a manufacturer and distributor of electrical quality copper
rod, wire and cable, sued three defendants (Morgan, Sumitomo and
Global) based on alleged violations of the Sherman Act86 and the
Clayton Act87 for conspiring to fix the price of copper.88 The district
court determined that Southwire’s claim against the defendants
accrued on July 23, 1996 after a press release implicated each of the
three defendants in a price fixing scheme.89 Using this date for the
beginning of the statute of limitations, the district court found that the
Sherman Act and Clayton Act’s four year statute of limitations had
expired before Southwire actually filed suit against the defendants on
December 30, 2002, and therefore dismissed Southwire’s claims.90

81

Id.
Loeb Indus., Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp., 306 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 2002).
83
Id.
84
In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 787-88.
85
Loeb Indus., Inc., 306 F.3d 469.
86
15 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. (2006).
87
15 U.S.C. § 15, et seq. (2006).
88
Loeb Indus., Inc., 306 F.3d at 474-78.
89
In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 786-88.
90
Id.
82
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Southwire contended that the statute of limitations under the
Sherman Act91 and the Clayton Act92 should have been tolled because
while the statue of limitations was running for its federal claims, it was
involved in a state class action against both Sumitomo and Morgan for
the very same antitrust violations it was alleging in the federal suit.93
In order to determine whether the Southwire was entitled to the benefit
of tolling the court examined Southwire’s antitrust claims in the
previously filed state class action.94
2.

The Previous State Class Actions: The Heliotrope Cases

Southwire originally was an unnamed class member in a class
action filed in California state court on July 8, 1996, asserting state
law antitrust violations against Sumitomo and Global, in which
Morgan was later added as a defendant.95 This case, Heliotrope
General, Inc v. Sumitomo Corp.,96 (Heliotrope I) established a class of
businesses that “purchased copper-based products and paid prices for
such copper-based products that were inflated due to the defendants'
manipulative and unlawful actions,” but was later abandoned by the
plaintiffs in June of 2000.97 A second class action, Heliotrope
General, Inc., v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse Ltd.,98 (Heliotrope II) was
filed on June 5, 2000 and asserted the same antitrust claims under
California law against Sumitomo, Global, and Morgan as Heliotrope
I.99 Three months after the California Superior Court certified the

91

15 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. (2006).
15 U.S.C. § 15, et seq. (2006).
93
In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 785-87.
94
Id. at 787 (“in order to benefit from the tolling rule for plaintiffs covered by a
class action announced in American Pipe, the court ruled identical legal theories
must be involved in both cases.”) (citations omitted).
95
Heliotrope General, Inc v. Sumitomo Corp., No. 701679 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1996).
96
Id.
97
In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 787.
98
Heliotrope General, Inc., No. 749280 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2000).
99
In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 787.
92
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class on January 22, 2003, Southwire opted out of the class, pursuing
its previously filed individual federal claims against the defendants.100
3.

The District Court’s Analysis of Southwire’s Individual
Federal Antitrust Claims

The district court rejected Southwire’s argument that the time
from which the second California state class action was commenced
until Southwire exercised its right to opt out, (June 5, 2000 through
March 22, 2003) should have tolled the statute of limitations for its
individual federal antitrust claims asserted in Loeb.101 The district
court completely rejected the notion of cross jurisdictional tolling,
finding that “because the [state class action] did not involve the same
causes of actions as those in [the federal suit] against defendants,
plaintiffs may not claim any tolling benefit from the [state class
action].”102 With this ruling, the district court refused to recognize the
similarity between state and federal antitrust laws by emphasizing that
the federal claims were different causes of action. In doing so, it
dismissed the entire concept of cross jurisdictional tolling by requiring
identical causes of action to facilitate tolling, a much more stringent
standard than expressed by Justice Powell in Crown, which required
only “the same evidence, memories, and witnesses as the subject
matter” to facilitate tolling.103
B. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS OF CROSS JURISDICTIONAL
TOLLING

100

Id. at 787-788. (Southwire was the last plaintiff to opt-out of the class action
on March 22, 2003).
101
Id. at 788. The district court did conclude that Southwire could benefit from
tolling from the federal class action antitrust suit filed against Morgan, but that time
period was not great enough to make a difference. Loeb Indus., Inc. v. J.P. Mogan &
Co., No. 00-C-274-C (W.D. Wis. 2000).
102
In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 788.
103
Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 355 (1983).
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Judge Cudahy issued the opinion for the court regarding the
tolling of Southwire’s federal antitrust claims based on its previously
filed state court class action.104 Confronting the issue of cross
jurisdictional tolling head on, Judge Cudahy stated, “Not only is there
no suggestion in American Pipe, or in Crown that these decisions
construing [Rule 23] have any direct application to parallel state
procedures, but the policies underlying American Pipe and like
precedents simply do not apply in the cross-jurisdictional context.”105
1. Does Cross Jurisdictional Tolling Promote Judicial Efficiency?
Judge Cudahy advanced two arguments to undermine the notion
of cross jurisdictional tolling. First, Judge Cudahy relied on the
procedural aspects of Rule 23 to distinguish between cross and intrajurisdictional tolling.106 Noting that plaintiffs who seek cross
jurisdictional tolling never face the potential to be “forced by the
federal statute of limitation to file duplicative claims” to protect their
interests, Judge Cudahy argued that the essential rationale behind
American Pipe could not apply to former members of a state class
action that later seek to sue individually in federal court.107 Through
this argument, Judge Cudahy contends that the federal courts do not
derive any efficiency from tolling the statute of limitations based on

104

In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 793. The majority rendered a two
part opinion, the first dealing with question of the accrual date of Southwire’s claims
which is beyond the scope of this article, and the second which specifically
addressed Southwire’s tolling argument. Id. at 788-793.
105
In re Copper Antitrust Litig.,436 F.3d at 793-94 (citing Am. Pipe & Constr.
Co., 414 U.S. 538; Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 462 U.S. 345).
106
In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 794 (“The situation contemplated
by the plaintiffs here is, however, quite different [from traditional tolling]. Here
plaintiffs have become members of a class in a state class action but want the federal
statute of limitations governing a factually similar federal claim to be tolled”).
107
Id. (“The essential rationale of American Pipe is that members of a class
whose claims are embodied in a class action should not be required by the exigencies
of the statute of limitations to clutter the courts with duplicative lawsuits as long as
their claims are encompassed by the class action.).
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state court actions. This lack of efficiency became Judge Cudahy’s
overarching concern throughout his opinion.108 Contrary to tolling
within a jurisdiction, which is intended to prevent class members from
presumptively filing individual actions to preserve their claims if their
class is not certified, tolling between jurisdictions would not prevent
presumptive filings because plaintiffs who previously filed their
claims in state court must file a claim in federal court as a means to
entering the federal system.109
However, Judge Cudahy’s conclusion that tolling would not
prevent presumptive filings is only applicable if you view the
plaintiff’s decision to file in federal court from the perspective of the
federal court. Judge Cudahy’s limited perspective fails to
acknowledge efficiency concerns of cross jurisdictional tolling beyond
that slight chance that some state filed claims would reach federal
court if the tolling was limited to “the same cause of action.”110
However, there is a dual efficiency served by allowing cross
jurisdictional tolling that Judge Cudahy’s opinion ignores. While
prospective state class action members have an incentive to sit on the
sidelines and wait until a certification decision is made, or to see how
the case is proceeding before deciding to opt out, they have no
incentive to hold off on any federal claims they could also assert.
Under In re Copper Antitrust Litigation,111 these state class members
will file suit as soon as possible to meet the federal statute of
limitations. Judge Cudahy is correct that the timing of this individual
federal suit does not implicate any efficiency concerns for the federal
court once a suit is filed, but it certainly does have an effect on
whether the state class member decides to file an individual federal
claim in the first place. If cross jurisdictional tolling were allowed,

108

Id. at 794-795.
Id. at 794 (“Since filing in federal court is a prerequisite to pursuing a federal
remedy regardless of the state class action, there will be no efficiency gain whether
the federal filing is made while the claimant is part of the state class action or later
[or never]”).
110
Id. at 794-795.
111
Id.
109
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state class members would not feel the pressure to concurrently file
their individual federal antitrust claims, which would provide for an
identical remedy as the state claim, because they could at least wait
and see if their claims were satisfied at the state level first.
Simply put, Judge Cudahy’s opinion assumes that prospective
state class action members will not file suit in federal court if they are
satisfied with the outcome in state court, without similarly assuming
that without the benefit of tolling, state class members will
presumptively file a federal claim as a safeguard to protect their
identical federal interests in case the class is not certified or because
they are not being adequately represented. This is the reason that the
same transaction and similar claims test is so important to the calculus
of extending the tolling doctrine, because it forces the court to view
the decision to file a federal suit from the plaintiff’s position. Judge
Cudahy is quite correct when he states that to the federal courts a
federal antitrust claim is distinct from a state antitrust claim simply
because of the separate jurisdictions,112 but then over extends the logic
of his statement. Judge Cudahy contends that whatever similarities
exist between the state and federal antitrust laws that create an interest
for the federal courts in the outcome of state court class actions; that
interest is not significant enough to extend American Pipe113 to allow
cross jurisdictional tolling. However, when Judge Cudahy’s limits his
view to how the federal court perceives a subsequent individual
federal suit as only necessary to enter into the federal system, he
overlooks the potential that state class members may never want to
pass through the gate in the first place. To the antitrust plaintiff the
state and federal remedies are identical. As a result, plaintiffs are just
as content to resolve their claims in state court as they would be in
federal court. State plaintiffs have no incentive to file a federal suit
until they determine whether or not the state suit is protecting their
interests.

112

Id. at 794.
Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 551 (1974).

113
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In her dissent, Judge Wood recognizes that plaintiffs are largely
disinterested in filing a federal suit in federal court until they realize
their interests are not being represented or until the case is dismissed.
Unlike Judge Cudahy, who concentrated on the difference between
state and federal jurisdiction to conclude that cross-jurisdictional
tolling is an over extension of the principles set forth in American
Pipe114 and Crown, 115Judge Wood relies on the similarities between
the state and federal jurisdictions in the antitrust class action
context.116 Judge Wood’s dissent highlights the common ground
between the state and federal jurisdictions through three comparisons.
Judge Wood challenged Judge Cudahy’s contention that crossjurisdictional tolling would not further the efficiency of the federal
courts. Noting, that if tolling is limited to identical causes of actions,
it “would encourage absent state class members to file protective
claims to assert their new legal theories,” as opposed to waiting to see
if their claims were resolved in the class action.117 These claims would
not necessarily remain in state court as diversity or federal subject
matter jurisdiction may place them in federal court. As a result of this
possibility, Judge Wood contended that cross jurisdictional tolling
would allow for the efficient resolution of class actions as
contemplated by Rule 23.118
Clearly the federal system loses efficiency when it adopts a tolling
rule that encourages every single state plaintiff involved in an antitrust
class action to file a simultaneous federal suit, despite the fact they
could obtain the exact same remedy in the state system. The parallel
state and federal antitrust schemes allows this case to fall into Justice
Powell’s “same evidence, memories, and witnesses as the subject

114

Id.
Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983).
116
See In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 803 (“Tolling here would
recognize the near-identity of claims and transactions and at the same time further
the goals of [Rule 23] to promote the fair and efficient adjudication of a
controversy”).
117
Id. at 803.
118
Id.
115
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matter of the original class suit”119 test indicating that in this context
tolling is not only an appropriate extension of the tolling doctrine, but
that cross jurisdictional tolling can promote judicial economy without
harming defendants in the proper context.
Judge Cudahy’s conclusion that tolling between jurisdictions
merely lengthens the time available for plaintiffs to assert their claim
in federal court120 highlights the paradox of cross jurisdictional tolling.
By increasing the time in which state antitrust class members can file
individual federal antitrust claims, the federal court can remove the
incentive for every state class action member to presumptively filing
federal claims, and thus promote judicial efficiency.
2. Do Significant Harms Exist to Offset a Gain in Judicial Efficiency?
Judge Cudahy also refused to adopt cross jurisdictional tolling on
the basis that Rule 23 allows class action litigants to stand aside and
let the class representative maintain their claims for them.121 In other
words, absent class members’ claims for purposes of Rule 23 are
functionally asserted when the class action is filed by the
representative. Therefore, tolling the statute of limitations until the
class is certified, and class members are given the opportunity to opt
out, merely recognizes that the representative tends to the class
members’ claims.122 Judge Cudahy emphasized that this formalistic
rationale behind tolling, which recognizes the “ordinary Rule 23
situation”123 where the class members claims are pursued by a
representative on their behalf is distinct from Southwire’s situation,

119

Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 462 U.S at 355.
See In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 795 (“If the requirements of the
statute of limitations result in the federal suit’s being brought while the state class
action is pending, there is no inefficiency or unfairness”).
121
Id. at 794 (Rule 23 is “in accordance with the theory that someone else is
making identical claims on behalf of the silent class members”).
122
Id. (“As long as [class members] are in effect passively tendering their claim
through inclusion in the class action, they should not be forced to proceed
individually, whether by intervention or otherwise”).
123
Id.
120
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where no one had filed a lawsuit in federal court on its behalf, and no
one may ever file a federal suit at all.124
Judge Cudahy also went on to challenge what he deemed Judge
Wood’s “functional equivalence” standard,125 echoing that the
separateness of state and federal jurisdictions overrides any benefits of
tolling the statute of limitations simply because federal and state
antitrust laws are similar.126
In light of the undeniable need for a state class action litigant to
avail themselves to federal antitrust laws by filing a suit in the federal
courts, Judge Cudahy held that Southwire’s participation in the
California state class action should have no effect on the tolling of the
statute of limitations for federal antitrust claims.127
While Judge Cudahy’s appeal to the distinct nature of the state
and federal jurisdictions is a powerful formalistic argument, it fails to
account for the gain in judicial efficiency associated with cross
jurisdictional tolling in this context. Significantly, Judge Cudahy fails
to identify any significant harm that would result from the expansion
of the tolling doctrine that would offset these gains in efficiency.128
Judge Cudahy does contend that refusing to adopt cross jurisdictional
tolling would allow defendants to be free from stale claims in due
time,129 but this concern contradicts Judge Cudahy’s acceptance of
Judge Wood’s conclusion that the maintenance of a state class action
asserting a state claim that is similar to federal claims puts defendants

124

Id.
Id. at 796.
126
Id. at 794 (“However similar or dissimilar the function of federal antitrust
law may be with respect to state law, the federal claim is part of a distinct that must
be pursued in a wholly different court system”).
127
Id.
128
The only harm identified by Judge Cudahy is that defendants in federal court
should not be expected to be on notice of claims from state court proceedings “two,
five, ten, or even more years down the road” Id. at 797. However, it is unlikely that
if the court adopted cross jurisdictional tolling the tolling period would ever reach
five years, let alone ten or more. The plaintiffs in In re Copper Antitrust Litig. sought
a tolling period of two and a half years. Id. at 788.
129
Id. at 797.
125
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on notice that they might be sued federally, and leads to the
preservation of evidence and memories.130
Judge Wood reached this conclusion by refusing to acknowledge
any functional differences between the way California treats state class
actions and the way Rule 23 treats federal class actions. Citing that
California courts “recognize and preserve the rights of absentee class
members even before the issue of certification has been
determined,”131 Judge Wood noted that California’s class action rules
adopt the same “representative filing” as Federal Rule 23. 132
Extending this reasoning, Judge Wood asserted that “the fact that the
first class action in this case happened to be in California is not
enough [alone] to defeat [cross-jurisdictional] tolling.”133 This
premise establishes the basis for the argument that an antitrust suit in
state court is functionally equivalent to an antitrust claim in federal
court.134
Further dismantling the wall erected by Judge Cudahy between
state and federal jurisdictions, Judge Wood examined the factual and
legal backgrounds of the underlying state and federal suits involved in
the litigation.135 To effectuate this examination, Judge Wood
formulated a standard for cross jurisdictional tolling derived from
Justice Powell’s “the same evidence, memories, and witnesses as the
subject matter” test from Crown,136 which requires that the earlier state
court class action arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the
subsequent federal action, and that the same claims be asserted from
those transaction and occurrences.137 To support this formulation,
Judge Wood maintained that the purpose of the statute of limitations is

130

Id. at 796.
In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 801-02 (citing Shapell Indus., Inc.
v. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 149 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)).
132
In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 801.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 799-800. (“The claims in the [previous state class action] are
functionally the same as those in the federal case”).
135
Id. at 800.
136
Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983).
137
Id. at 355; In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 798.
131
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“to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost,
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.” 138
Accordingly, Judge Wood concentrated on whether the
Southwire’s state court class action effectively gave the defendants in
the federal suit notice of claims against them.139 After examining the
claims asserted in the California state class action by Southwire, Judge
Wood concluded that all relevant interests of the statute of limitations
would be served by tolling because “the [previous] California suit and
the current suit cover the same ground.”140 Therefore, the defendants
would be aware of the claims asserted against them regardless of
tolling. Specifically drawing comparisons between the state and
federal suits Judge Wood noted that “[t]he Heliotrope litigation
involved the same facts, evidence, and witnesses as the present
action,” and that “the two lawsuits also involve virtually identical legal
claims, albeit with different statutory labels.”141
Judge Wood also recognized that the similarity of the California
antitrust laws and the federal antitrust laws could functionally preclude
plaintiffs from alleging federal causes of action due to claim
preclusion,142 thereby asserting that it is plaintiffs who are actually
harmed by refusing to extend cross jurisdictional tolling, not
defendants. Judge Wood cites the California Supreme Court’s
decision in Aguliar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., which held that “because
[section 1] of California’s Cartwright Act is patterned after the federal
Sherman Act and both have their roots in common law, federal cases
interpreting the Sherman Act are applicable in construing the
Cartwright Act,”143 to reiterate the fact that had Southwire remained in

138

In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 798 (citing Order of R.R.
Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (1944).
139
In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 799-800.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 801-02.
143
Id. (citing Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co., 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841
(Cal. 2001)).
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the California State class action issues decided there would have been
precluded in a subsequent federal antitrust suit. While Judge Wood
acknowledged that Southwire’s antitrust claims never faced the
possibility of being completely barred in a federal action under
California’s issue preclusion laws,144 Southwire would have faced the
reality of issue-preclusion had it remained in the California class
action. Due to the similarities in state and federal antitrust laws,145
Judge Wood noted that issue preclusion concerning key antitrust
questions like relevant market would functionally bar Southwire’s
federal claims, and thereby unnamed state class action members would
lose the very same rights they would lose if there class action was filed
in federal court.146
Unlike, Judge Cudahy’s view of the relation between state and
federal court proceedings which are necessarily separate, Judge
Wood’s examination of issue-preclusion attempts to display the
interrelatedness of the state and federal courts within the antitrust
context. Appropriately, the closer these two forums become the easier
it is to justify cross jurisdictional tolling.
III. CONCLUSION
It is clear that American Pipe147 simply asserts a federal interest
in assuring the efficiency and economy of the class action

144

The Supreme Court’s decision in Marrese v. American Academy of
Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 375 (1985) dictates that state law principals of
claim preclusion are applied in federal courts when deciding whether federal claims
are barred by a state court’s decision.
145
Both the Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16720 (2006), and the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 (2006), require the plaintiff to define the relevant market
in which an anticompetitive effect is created, and identify specific antitrust injuries
resulting from the defendant’s actions.
146
In re Copper Antitrust Litig.,436 F.3d at 802.
147
Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 551 (1974).
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procedure.148 The intricacies hidden within this broad statement reveal
the significance of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re Copper
Antitrust Litigation.149 The dialogue between Judge Cudahy and
Wood sets forth a paradigm for other Circuit Courts to debate the
question of cross jurisdictional tolling. However, the impact of
denying the benefit of tolling to state class action plaintiffs who later
assert federal claims creates an otherwise unnecessary incentive for
those class members to file concurrent federal action at the
commencement of their class action suit. That incentive will directly
result in a loss of judicial efficiency for the federal court system, as it
will be required to deal with claims that otherwise never would have
been filed. In the end, the Seventh Circuit’s desire to maintain a rigid
separation between the federal and state judicial system by rejecting
cross jurisdictional tolling where state and federal claims are
functionally identical will only intertwine the two jurisdictions further
by instituting a policy of dual filing for antitrust claims.

148

Kathleen L. Cerveny, Limitation Tolling When Class Status Denied:
Chardon v. Fumero Soto and Alice In Wonderland, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 686
(1985).
149
In re Copper Antitrust Litig. ,436 F.3d 782.
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